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ARTICLE
PROPHETS, CARTOONS, AND LEGAL
NORMS: RETHINKING THE UNITED




In 1948, the international community sought to create a
normative scheme of universal human rights legislation with the
creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR")
by the United Nations.1 The project has faced the inevitable
difficulty in finding any baseline source of agreement between
the cultures represented at the United Nations. Efforts to
identify universal values upon which normative human rights
principles can be built have proven difficult at best, with some
claiming that the entire venture is necessarily an abject failure.2
t Associate, Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P. J.D., 2008, St. John's University
School of Law; M.A., Theology, 2004, Boston College; B.A., English and Theology,
2002, Boston College. The author is eternally grateful to his parents Barry and
Beverly Foster for their love and guidance throughout his life and to Kelly Foster for
always being an inspiration and an aspiration.
' The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") was passed in 1948,
largely in response to the atrocities committed during World War II. See Franklin &
Eleanor Roosevelt Inst., Didn't Nazi Tyranny End All Hope for Protecting Human
Rights in the Modern World? (Aug. 28, 1998), http://www.udhr.org/Introduction/
question4.htm. One reason for its genesis was the consensus that the United
Nations Charter did not adequately define the rights it allegedly protected. See
Franklin & Eleanor Roosevelt Inst., Drafting and Adoption: The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Aug. 27, 1998), http://www.udhr.orghistory/overview.
htm. The Declaration was adopted by a vote of forty-eight to zero, with eight
abstentions. United Nations Ass'n of Can., Questions and Answers About the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, http://www.unac.org/rights/question.html
(last visited Jan. 10, 2009).
2 In an op-ed for a Canadian newspaper, Bush advisor Richard Perle stated that
"coalitions of the willing .... are... the [only] alternative to the anarchy of the
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Notwithstanding the criticism, the international community
must continually adapt to changing political and cultural
climates with strong statements proclaiming the inviolability of
certain common ideals, if for no other reason than to articulate a
critical philosophical framework.
Particularly vexing for the proponents of universal human
rights has been the issue of religious freedom. The difficulties
inherent with forging consensus in a multicultural paradigm
become even more difficult-potentially even impossible-when
debating the boundaries of religious freedom.4  Historically,
efforts at identifying basic rights to be protected on both a
national and an international level have taken the form of
promulgating "universal" principles-a baseline threshold upon
which, theoretically, we can achieve agreement through cross-
cultural dialogue.5
abject failure of the United Nations." Richard Perle, Coalitions of the Willing Are
Our Best Hope, NAT'L POST (Can.), Mar. 21, 2003, at A19.
3 The UDHR set forth the seminal language that has been adopted, debated,
and altered by subsequent U.N. documents, international agreements, and domestic
legislation. It provides, in pertinent part, that "[elveryone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A, art. 18, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR]. Much of the debate over the extent of religious freedom centers
around the very meaning of each of those somewhat ambiguous terms.
4 See Robert D. Sloane, Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the
Universality of International Human Rights, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 527, 552
(2001) ("This difficulty achieving consensus, moreover, increases exponentially when
we recognize that, since the adoption of the UDHR in 1948, the membership of the
United Nations has increased from 56 to 185 states. The United Nations today
embraces societies that manifest cultural divergences potentially far more varied
and severe than the already intractable Cold War ideological rift that preoccupied
the drafters." (footnote omitted)).
' The U.N. has been the preeminent organization that has sought to define and
secure these rights. For example, the first, and perhaps most famous, of these efforts
is the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which was promulgated in 1948.
UDHR, supra note 3, pmbl. Subsequent documents and treaties have drawn on the
language of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in explicitly identifying
universal values and mores, although not directly in their titles. See, e.g.,
Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, at 186, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986) ("Considering that under the provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights everyone is entitled to a social and international order
in which the rights and freedoms set forth in that Declaration can be fully
realized . . . ." (footnote omitted)); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, at 194, U.N. Doc. A/Res/34/180
(Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter Elimination of Discrimination Against Women] (NA]ll
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and... everyone is
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein .... "); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), pmbl., U.N. GAOR,
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The project of creating a universal human rights scheme that
respects religious freedom has undergone many philosophical
justifications, ranging from simple social cohesion to a focus on
freedom and equality.' However, the most successful-defined as
the prevailing justification that appears in these international
documents-is a focus upon human dignity.7 For purposes of this
Article, human dignity is defined broadly as the notion that there
is something inherent in the individual human being that
mandates, as a matter of principle, that certain things should be
done for her and certain things should not.' Rights defined in
subsequent international documents are premised on individual
autonomy and dignity reflected in the first article of the UDHR,
which states that "[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood."9 This statement seemingly evinces both social and
legal obligations by referencing both an individual moral
obligation related to interpersonal behavior and a broader legal
obligation to create an environment conducive to the flourishing
of these principles.1"
This statement, however, can create a philosophical-not to
mention theological, sociological, and political-minefield, and
history has demonstrated that international efforts at creating a
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] (recognizing
"the inherent dignity and ... the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family"). The United Nations Charter itself reaffirms a "faith in fundamental
human rights" and the "equal rights of men and women and of nations large and
small." U.N. Charter pmbl.
6 For example, social cohesion is a prudential justification, essentially
maintaining that protecting religious dissenters will result in less social strife. By
contrast, natural law justifications posit that religious liberty is a value that can be
proven through reason, independent of any revealed truth. Freedom and equality
entail protection of religious freedom precisely because we do not want to
discriminate based on religious belief. This, in turn, depends upon recognizing the
inherent value in not discriminating on any basis to begin with.
I Countless U.N. documents have focused on human dignity as a philosophical
justification, largely because it represents a baseline principle that most, if not all,
cultures can begin to agree upon. See infra Part II.A.4.
s The intersection of what should be done and what should be refrained from is
the subject of immense debate and is the focus of this Article in the context of
religious liberty and defamation.
9 UDHR, supra note 3, art. 1.
10 In other words, it seems that international human rights norms are conceived
of as individual rights vis-a-vis the state, in addition to individual rights vis-A-vis
the person.
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universal scheme to protect these rights can be woefully lacking,
either in theory or in practice. In fashioning a "universality
hermeneutic," either nations agree on broad, somewhat
undefined principles-even if they do not agree on the underlying
rationale for the principle-or nations fail to agree and maintain
competing visions of the rights and obligations at issue."
In 2005, these competing tensions came into serious
conflict-both philosophically and literally-when the Danish
newspaper Jyllands-Posten printed a series of twelve cartoons
depicting the Prophet Muhammad in various satirical
caricatures. 12  Particularly controversial was one cartoon
depicting Muhammad with his turban in the shape of a bomb. 3
Protests erupted worldwide in response to the perceived affront
to the Islamic faith 4 after a number of newspapers reprinted the
cartoons.' 5 These protests resulted in over 100 deaths worldwide,
including Muslim men and children who were trampled during
11 A perfect example of these competing visions centers on the role of religious
freedom, more specifically the freedom to change one's religion, in Islam as
compared with Europe. In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
a majority of the international community declared that freedoms of religion and
conscience include the ability to change one's belief system according to his or her
conscience. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 18(1). However, Islamic nations resisted this
aspect of the ICCPR and ultimately refused to sign. In response, these Islamic
nations promulgated the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights, which many claim to
be the Islamic version of the UDHR. This covenant noted, among other provisions,
that freedom of religion and conscience is to be respected; however, it is always
subject to the Shari'a. Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, art. 24 (Aug. 5,
1990), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtxlhome/opendoc.htm?tbl=
RSDLEGAL&page=research&id=3ae6b3822c. Of course, the Shari'a forbids Muslims
from leaving the Islamic faith, and many Islamic theocracies consider this apostasy
a capital offense.
12 See Dan Bilefsky, Denmark Is Unlikely Front in Islam-West Culture War, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, § 1, at 3.
13 Id. Many commentators have noted that the cartoons are relatively
"uninteresting." See, e.g., Anver M. Emon, On the Pope, Cartoons, and Apostates:
Shari'a 2006, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 303, 308 (2006). Whether this sentiment belies a
lack of sensitivity to the Muslim world is a question unto itself and, unfortunately,
can only be dealt with tangentially in this Article.
14 Arabic newspapers provided fuel for the fire by printing cartoons in the Arab
world that were far more offensive than those that originally appeared in the Danish
newspaper. See Lorenzo Vidino, Creating Outrage: Meet the Imam Behind the
Cartoon Overreaction, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Feb. 6, 2006, http://www.nationalreview.
com/comment/vidino2006O2O6O735.asp.
15 See Anthony Shadid & Kevin Sullivan, Anatomy of the Cartoon Protest
Movement, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2006, at Al. The reason for the strong reaction in
the Muslim world is the deeply-held belief in Islam that any depiction of Muhammad
is blasphemous. See id.
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riots.16 The backlash extended beyond violence and resulted in
significant political and economic ramifications for the small
country of Denmark.17
In response-undoubtedly to the immense political pressure
and worldwide violence-the United Nations Human Rights
Council passed a resolution to combat the "defamation of
religion.""8 The Human Rights Council had previously passed
several versions of the resolution over the objection of
non-Muslim countries, though it garnered little publicity
presumably due to the lack of a flashpoint to bring it attention.
The resolution passed in 2006 drew upon reports offered by two
Special Rapporteurs, who studied the situation from two distinct
perspectives based upon their defined specialties. 9  The
Rapporteurs reached different conclusions as to the nature of the
discrimination experienced by Muslims. 20
The controversy demonstrates a conflict between two
different philosophies regarding the relative value of the rights
at stake, namely, the right to free expression embodied in the
printing of the cartoons and the 2006 Resolution's attempt to
create a new right to be free from hearing or viewing defamatory
statements about one's religion. Significantly, the international
community supporting these provisions attempts to divine this
alleged new right from the well-established religious liberty
16 Nigeria experienced over 100 deaths alone. Lydia Polgreen, Nigeria Counts
100 Deaths over Danish Caricatures, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2006, at A8.
11 See Shadid & Sullivan, supra note 15; Vidino, supra note 14. The Islamic rage
related to the Danish cartoons reappeared in the "Teddy Bear Controversy" two
years later. See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, Hundreds of Sudanese Demand Execution of
British Teacher, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2007, at A6. In that case, a British teacher,
Gillian Gibbons, teaching in Sudan, allowed her class to name a teddy bear after a
popular child in the classroom whose name was Muhammad. Ms. Gibbons was
sentenced to fifteen days in jail for her offense, although under Sudanese law the
maximum penalty is six months incarceration and forty lashes. Id.
18 Combating Defamation of Religions, G.A. Res. 61/164, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/164 (Dec. 19, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Resolution]; see also U.N. Econ. &
Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Human Rights, Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and All Forms of Discrimination, 4, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/18/Add.4 (Dec. 13, 2004) (prepared by Doudou Diene) [hereinafter
ECOSOC Report on All Forms of Discrimination].
19 See David Keane, Addressing the Aggravated Meeting Points of Race and
Religion, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 367, 394-95 (2006)
(discussing the Special Rapporteur reports in the context of the Danish cartoon
controversy).
20 See id. at 395-97.
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rights provisions already recognized by a majority of the
international community at large.
This Article contends that the U.N.'s response to the outcry
over the Danish cartoons continues to mistake the extent to
which human dignity warrants its conclusion.21 In fact, the
U.N.'s response has the opposite effect of inhibiting the full
expression of human dignity by taking an overly paternalistic
response in contravention of what human dignity demands.22 A
legal scheme that emphasizes greater protection of free speech in
this delicate balance adequately protects the normative values
stemming from principles of human dignity. Furthermore, the
potential effect of implementing defamation of religion legislation
domestically would be to drastically impinge on other, well-
established human rights, creating the opposite effect that the
resolutions intended.
Part I of this Article examines the Danish cartoon
controversy in more detail and attempts to identify the values
that came into such harsh conflict. Part II examines the
structure of the U.N. prior to the controversy, specifically the
committees and the commissions created to focus on religious
liberties, and it identifies the governing principles in place at the
time of the publications. Part II also examines the U.N.'s
response to the controversy and the new dynamic achieved by the
2006 Resolution.2 3 Part III contrasts the U.N.'s response with
the American dynamic, which is an example of a "free speech
model." Part IV argues that the 2006 Resolution functions to
undermine the concept of human dignity that it professes to
21 It is important to note that this Article does not seek to answer an altogether
different question: Should the newspaper have published the cartoons as a matter of
morality? This Article is only concerned with the legal framework that the U.N. has
attempted to institute and whether the scheme protects human dignity better than
the American legal system in the context of "defamatory" editorials aimed at
religious entities. It is not concerned with whether, as a matter of individual or
group ethics, these statements should be made, just whether the statements should
be allowed.
" This is not meant to suggest that a response was not warranted. The
incredible outcry and extreme violence that shook much of Europe and the Arab
world would certainly legitimize some sort of international response.
23 Throughout this Article, the term "Defamation Resolutions" will be used to
refer to all of the defamation of religion resolutions passed by the United Nations.
References to the 2006 Resolution will refer specifically to the version passed in
2006, which has particular significance due to the context in which it was passed,
although the actual provision does not differ from previous versions. See infra notes
50-53 and accompanying text and Part II.B.2.
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protect. Finally, Part IV argues that the 2006 Resolution is
dangerously vague and has the practical effect of impinging other
human rights in its enforcement. Accordingly, despite its alleged
shortcomings, a system that seeks to protect free expression to a
greater degree, like the American system, is more philosophically
consistent with the normative values of human dignity
underpinning international human rights than the 2006
Resolution.
I. THE DANISH CARTOON CONTROVERSY
As Muslim countries have gained exposure to other cultures
in modern society, they have come increasingly into conflict with
Western countries, often with bitter results.24 This tension stems
from many sources, which will be discussed further below, and
often erupts into violence or leads to racism from both sides.
This became the most evident in the recent controversy
surrounding the publication of satirical cartoons in the Danish
newspaper, Jyllands-Posten; though, the incident hardly marks
the first time the Muslim world reacted to allegedly blasphemous
words and images.25
In 2005, Jyllands-Posten printed a series of cartoons
featuring images of the prophet Muhammad. The cartoons
depicting Muhammad are "rather uninteresting" to American
eyes.26 One American newspaper source described the cartoons
as "tame to the point of dullness, especially compared to the
biting editorial cartoons that routinely appear in [U.S.] and
European newspapers."27 Most of the cartoons simply depicted
24 The underlying reasons for this tension are beyond the scope of this Article.
What remains clear, however, is that a significant amount of the backlash is directly
attributable to the lack of basic understanding in the West of Islamic culture and
jurisprudence. See TARIQ RAMADAN, WESTERN MUSLIMS AND THE FUTURE OF ISLAM
31 (2004) ("[The misunderstanding of Shari'a] has reached the extent that many
Muslim intellectuals do not dare even to refer to the concept for fear of frightening
people or arousing suspicion of all their work by the mere mention of the word.").
25 See Peter Goodspeed, Orchestrated 'Clash of Civilizations': Global Protests
Were Anything but Spontaneous, NAT'L POST (Can.), Feb. 9, 2006, at A12 (discussing
previous conflicts between politically Muslim countries and the West); Shadid &
Sullivan, supra note 15. Other incidents include, most prominently, the fatwah
leveled against British author, Salman Rushdie, in 1989 for blasphemy due to his
book The Satanic Verses. See Mouhajger: Islam Was Made to Govern, MIDDLE E.
DEF. NEWS, Dec. 11, 1989.
26 Emon, supra note 13.
27 Jeff Jacoby, We Are All Danes Now, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 2006, at Ell.
Jacoby goes on to condemn the protests over the cartoons in unequivocal terms. Id.
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Muhammad in various caricatures, with the most inflammatory
cartoon depicting Muhammad with a turban shaped as a bomb.2"
Most commentaries in the United States expressed confusion as
to the reaction, which would seemingly be viewed as a simple
expression of free speech at home.
Muslims in Europe and around the world took deep offense
to the publication. Initially, the reaction in Europe was
somewhat muted, with small, relatively uneventful protests
dotting the landscape. 29  However, the Muslim world quickly
erupted as they became exposed to the cartoons on regional
television and newspapers. 0 Soon, protests ignited all over the
globe as Muslims expressed their sense of outrage at the
perceived indignity of the cartoons. Tens of thousands of
Muslims protested and engaged in massive rioting, torching
embassies and other government buildings, and violent reprisal
against police, which resulted in over 100 deaths worldwide,
However, Jacoby fails, like so many other public commentaries on the issue, to
emphasize that his opinions apply to a small segment of the Muslim population,
namely radical Islamists. This backlash has become a significant problem in many
areas and serves to stunt mature, intellectual discussion of the problem.
28 See Kareem Fahim, More than 1,000 Protest Cartoon Depiction of Prophet,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2006, at B3.
29 In fact, the controversy did not take great hold until several European
newspapers reprinted the cartoons several months later. See Carlotta Gall & Craig
S. Smith, Muslim Protests Against Cartoons Spread, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2006, at A8
(describing the increasing tension and violence in the weeks following the
republication).
20 It should be noted that Muslim religious leaders were largely responsible for
inciting this reaction in the Arab world. It is well documented that Muslim leaders
drafted additional cartoons, amounting to at least sixty in total, for distribution
throughout their countries. It is readily apparent that they intentionally
exacerbated the controversy to stir up a harsh Muslim reaction.
Danish Imams initially led the charge by creating a dossier to be circulated
throughout the Arab world. The aim was to demonstrate the culture of Islamaphobia
that existed in England. See Martin Asser, What the Muhammad Cartoons Portray,
BBC NEWS, Feb. 9, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/4693292.stm. In
particular, the Imams circulated three additional images. Id. One image was of a
man wearing a pig mask and was presented under the auspices of a Western
depiction of Muhammed. Id.
Furthermore, there is evidence that Muslim nations take measures to blaspheme
other cultures and religious traditions, particularly Judaism. For example, in
response to the controversy, Iran held an art exhibition featuring exclusively
anti-Jewish art, entitled the "Holocaust International Cartoon Contest." See Michael
Slackman, Iran Exhibits Anti-Jewish Art as Reply to Danish Cartoons, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 2006, at A8. This hypocrisy is at the heart of the controversy about whether
a universal human right or ethic can even be created and will be discussed below.
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including a number of children and teenagers. 31 The political
fallout included the boycott of Danish goods, the removal of
diplomats, and a rebuke from the E.U.32 The outrage was largely
directed at Europe, specifically Christian populations, and
continued for months. Although this Article is two and one half
years removed from the initial publication, the controversy still
simmers and reappears regularly. As recently as January 2008,
three Muslim militants were arrested in Denmark for plotting to
kill Kurt Westergaard, the artist responsible for the most
controversial cartoon.3  In response, seventeen Danish
newspapers reprinted the cartoons three weeks later.34  Most
recently, Osama bin Laden referenced the cartoon controversy as
a rallying cry for Muslim extremists.35
The newspaper that initially printed the cartoons, and
specifically the cultural editor, Flemming Rose, actually solicited
the depictions in September 2005.36 Rose came up with the
contest after hearing that Danish writer Kare Bluitgen could not
find artists willing to illustrate a children's book about
Muhammad because they feared violent reprisal from Muslim
communities .3  He stated that while he knew that Islam
prohibited the depictions of Muhammad, he certainly did not
31 See Griff Witte & Ellen Nakashima, Cartoon Protests Stoke Anti-American
Mood, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2006, at A15 (discussing attacks on embassies in
Afghanistan and around the world); 15 Killed in Nigerian Cartoon Protests, MSNBC
NEWS, Feb. 18, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11383819 ("Nigerian Muslims
protesting caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad attacked Christians and burned
churches... killing at least 15 people ... ."); Muslim Cartoon Fury Claims
Lives, BBC NEWS, Feb. 6, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/4684652.stm
(reporting that five were killed in Afghanistan and a teenage boy was killed in
Somalia).
32 See Fahim, supra note 28; Gall & Smith, supra note 29.
See Agence France-Presse, Denmark: Papers Reprint Muhammad Cartoon,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2008, at A12.
14 See id.
3- To mark the fifth anniversary of the war in Iraq, Osama bin Laden released a
tape in which he discusses the Danish cartoon controversy. Specifically, bin Laden
stated that Europe would be punished for the cartoons. See Philip Pullella, Vatican
Rejects bin Laden's "New Crusade" Charges, REUTERS, Mar. 20, 2008, http:l!
www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL2043585320080320?feedType=RSS&feed
Name=worldNews&rpc=22&sp=true.
36 See Dan Bilefsky, Danish Cartoon Editor on Indefinite Leave, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2006, at A5. Rose invited twenty-five cartoonists to create pictures of
Muhammad "how they saw him." Id. Twelve cartoonists responded. See id.
31 See id.
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expect the reaction that followed.3" According to Rose, his
decision to publish the cartoons had nothing to do with latent
prejudice, racism, or religious insensitivity:
Equal treatment is the democratic way to overcome traditional
barriers of blood and soil for newcomers. To me, that
means treating immigrants just as I would any other
Danes .... Those images in no way exceeded the bounds of
taste, satire and humor to which I would subject any other
Dane, whether the queen, the head of the church or the prime
minister. By treating a Muslim figure the same way that I
would a Christian or Jewish icon, I was sending an important
message: You are not strangers, you are here to stay, and we
accept you as an integrated part of our life .... It was an act of
inclusion, not exclusion; an act of respect and recognition. 3
9
Whether Rose is genuine in his statement, his "equal
opportunity offender" approach did not find traction or legitimacy
in Muslim eyes. Rose, however, has found at least modest
support in his home country, with several news organizations
expressing solidarity with him by reprinting the cartoons,
sparking new hostilities between Denmark and the Muslim
community.4 °
The outrage from the Muslim community stems from its
religious belief that depictions of Muhammad are blasphemous.
As the reaction to the cartoons indicates, this belief is a deeply
held conviction, and the publication of the cartoons was seen as a
severe insult for which the newspaper had to pay.41 To make
matters worse, Denmark is a small country steeped in a long
38 See id.
31 Flemming Rose, Op-Ed., Why I Published the Muhammad Cartoons,
N.Y.TIMEs.coM, May 31, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/31/world/europe/
31spiegel.html?pagewanted=l&_r=&sq=why%20i%20published%20the%20muham
mad%20cartoons&st=cse&scp= 1.
40 See Michael Kimmelman, Outrage at Cartoons Still Tests the Danes, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2008, at El (interviewing Kurt Westergaard, the cartoonist who
drew the image of Muhammad with a bomb in his turban, about his life in hiding in
Denmark).
41 See Protesters Burn Consulate over Cartoons, CNN.COM, Feb. 5, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/O2/05/cartoon.protests/index.html. It
should be noted that Iran reacted very publicly to the controversy by displaying an
art exhibit entitled "Holocaust International Cartoon Contest" in Tehran that
featured over 200 cartoons satirizing members of the Jewish faith. See Slackman,
supra note 30. Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claimed that his intent was
to expose Western hypocrisy at condemning his denial of the Holocaust while
supporting the publication of the Danish cartoons. See id.
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tradition of cultural homogeneity and is perceived as being
unforgiving to foreigners, particularly immigrants.42  These
tensions, be they racial, ethnic, or religious, also had been
previously exacerbated by Pope Benedict XVI's proclamation that
Europe and Christianity share a common identity.43
Another significant factor contributing to Muslim
indignation is the Danish government's response to the
controversy. After the publication, the Muslim community called
upon the government to assess civil and criminal penalties
against the newspaper and its editors. Denmark's criminal code
includes two relevant provisions criminalizing both hate speech
and blasphemy. The hate speech law makes it a crime for "[a]ny
person [to] ... persecute[] or incite[] hatred against any group of
the Danish population because of its creed, race or nationality."44
Denmark's blasphemy law criminalized actions by "[a]ny person
who exposes to ridicule or insults the dogmas or worship of any
lawfully existing religious community."45
The public prosecutor assigned to investigate the case
concluded that based upon these provisions, no criminal behavior
had occurred.46 The prosecutor stated that the publication
42 See Lauren Gilbert, National Identity and Immigration Policy in the U.S. and
the European Union, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 99, 129-30 (2008) (discussing the cartoon
controversy and Denmark's welfare system and the resulting hostility toward
Muslim immigrants).
4 Benedict XVI, Meeting with the Representatives of Science at the University
of Regensburg: Faith, Reason, and the University (Sept. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/benedict-xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/
hf_ben-xvispe_20060912_university-regensburg-en.html. Particularly controversial
was Pope Benedict's reference to Emperor Manuel II Paleologous, a medieval
Byzantine Emperor, who stated: "Show me just what Mohammed brought that was
new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman .... " Id. The Pope was
met with protests for his statement, perceived to be religiously insensitive, despite
his insistence that he did not share the Emperor's view. See Christian Leader Joins
Muslims in Denouncing Pope's Remarks, FOXNEWS.COM, Sept. 16, 2006,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,214167,00.html.
4 BORGERLIG STRAFFELOV § 266b, translated in Danish Criminal Code § 266b
(G.E.C. Gad, 1958).
45 Id. § 140.
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Response by the Danish
Government to Letter of 24 November 2005 from UN Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Religion or Belief, Ms. Asma Jahangir, and UN Special Rapporteur on
Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance, Mr. Doudou Diane, Regarding Cartoons Representing the Prophet
Mohammed Published in a Newspaper 2 (Jan. 23, 2006), available at
http://www.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/00D9E6F7-32DC-4C5A-8E24-FOC96E813C06/0/060
123final.pdf.
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concerned an incident of public interest." Where a publication
concerns some public interest, journalists have more editorial
freedom.4" This proclamation infuriated Muslims in Denmark
who felt that although the government provided statutory
protections for incidents such as this, the public dismissal of any
charges represented a patent hostility toward the Muslim
community.
49
II. UNITED NATIONS STRUCTURE AND RESPONSE
In response to the protests around the world stemming from
the cartoon controversy, the United Nations Human Rights
Council in 2006 quickly debated and passed a nonbinding
resolution condemning the "defamation of religion."50 The
Resolution urges participant countries to pass legislation that
would protect religious groups from being exposed to defamatory
words and images.5' This Resolution does not represent the first
foray into the "defamation of religion" field, as the U.N. has
debated this phenomenon since 1999 and issued periodic
resolutions tracking the same language.52 The 2006 Resolution
was adopted by a vote of twenty-four to fourteen with nine
abstentions and mentions no religion other than Islam, a clear
indication that the Council was concerned with the rise of
47 Id.
4 Id.
49 See Richard N. Winfield, An Editorial Controversy Metastasizing: Denmark's
Hate Speech Laws, 24 COMM. LAW. 35, 35-36 (2006).
5 See generally 2006 Resolution, supra note 18.
51 Id. The 2006 Resolution urges member states to provide protection against
"acts of hatred, discrimination, intimidation and coercion resulting from defamation
of religions." Id. 10. The provision further urges states to "complement legal
systems with intellectual and moral strategies to combat religious hatred and
intolerance." Id. Given its passage shortly after the cartoon controversy, it is safe to
assume that the U.N. intended that these provisions cover these types of
publications. Specifically, it appears that the U.N. is urging its member states to
criminalize publications that would offend a religious believer on the basis of his
beliefs and therefore, criminalize the action taken by the Danish newspaper.
Evidently, the provisions in place in Denmark simply did not protect religious
minorities sufficiently in the eyes of the Human Rights Council.
It should also be noted that the second phrase that advocates for moral strategies to
combat religious hatred should undoubtedly be acceptable to nearly all countries.
This provision is not objectionable to the premise of this Article. However, the prior
phrase presents problems, which are discussed below.
52 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Combating Defamation of
Religions, at 56, U.N. Doc. E/2002/23-E/CN.412002/200 (Apr. 15, 2002).
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Islamaphobia.13  To fully understand this response, one must
examine United Nations materials, including the various U.N.
bodies and documents relating to the development of the
defamation of religion principle.
A. United Nations Background
In 1945, the United Nations was founded by fifty-one
countries "committed to preserving peace through international
cooperation. 54  Currently, the United Nations comprises 192
member countries, nearly every nation in the world.5 5  The
United Nations Charter, which formally established the U.N.,
identifies the fundamental aims for the organization including
promoting social progress, and most importantly for this Article's
purposes, to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person."56  The U.N.
accomplishes this aim through the cooperation of member states
on various committees. While some U.N. documents, such as
international treaties, are binding upon the member states who
sign them, many of the U.N. provisions are nonbinding. These
nonbinding resolutions urge states to take legal and legislative
action domestically to ensure the protection of the relevant rights
and are often preferable for countries precisely because they do
not require action. However, many argue that failing to adopt
nonbinding resolutions domestically has significant political
consequences over time, and some consider the provisions to
constitute bona fide international law that defines the obligations
of member states by virtue of their membership."
53 See How the Islamic States Dominate the UN Human Rights Council, INT'L
HUMANIST & ETHICAL UNION, Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.iheu.org/node/2546. One of
the major criticisms of the Human Rights Council's predecessor, also symptomatic of
its predecessor, the Commission on Human Rights, is that the Council is dominated
by bloc-based voting. Accordingly, many of these votes can be predictable, yielding
what some commentators describe as international norms supported primarily by
non-democratic regimes. See Posting of Ilya Somin to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1207205558.shtml (Apr. 3, 2008, 02:52 EST). United
Nations, UN in Brief (2000),
54 UNITED NATIONS, UN IN BRIEF (2000), http://www.un.org/Overview/uninbrief/
chapterl-intro.html
55 Id.
56 U.N. Charter pmbl.
57 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 301 reporters' notes
2 (discussing the effect of nonbinding international documents).
11 See generally 44B AM. JUR. 2D INTERNATIONAL LAW § 7 (2008) (discussing the
force and effect of international law).
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1. Creating a Human Rights Framework
One of the major initiatives of the U.N. is to ensure the
protection of human rights for citizens across the globe. The first
document proclaiming the primacy of human rights is the United
Nations Declaration on Human Rights, published in 1948.19 The
General Assembly, the general body where all member states are
represented in a parliamentary fashion, passed the Declaration
by a vote of forty-eight to zero, with eight abstentions.6 0 For this
Article's purposes, the most important provision appears in
article 18:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship, and observance.6 1
This sweeping statement laid the groundwork for the myriad of
international covenants, declarations, and protocols that have
attempted to clarify the exact meaning of this passage. However,
its broad language does not permit an easy interpretation,
particularly when considered against the grand scope of the U.N.
experiment. The very fact that several countries abstained from
voting to pass the resolution in the General Assembly speaks
volumes to the varying perspectives from which countries
approach the problem. Upon the passage of the Declaration, the
U.N. was prepared to turn to deliberation on implementation
measures.
2. Organizational Structure
The main human rights body responsible for review and
implementation of human rights norms is the United Nations
Human Rights Council, a charter-based body. The General
Assembly created the Human Rights Council in 2006 to replace
the oft-criticized United Nations Commission on Human Rights.62
6 UDHR, supra note 3.
60 United Nations Ass'n in Can., supra note 1. The eight abstentions are
comprised of the Soviet bloc and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia's abstention from this
declaration, and many other similar U.N. resolutions, will be discussed extensively
below and provides a good example of the tension between Muslim theocracies and
other secular political systems.
61 UDHR, supra note 3.
62 G.A. Res. 60/251 1, 5(g), U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (Mar. 15, 2006).
2009] PROPHETS, CARTOONS, AND LEGAL NORMS 33
The Human Rights Council is a subsidiary body of the General
Assembly composed of forty-seven members. 3 The principal
human rights official in the United Nations is the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, who leads the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
("OHCHR"). The OHCHR "spearheads the United Nations'
human rights efforts."64
The Human Rights Council is both a deliberative and
actionable body. One main function of the Council is to provide
recommended human rights resolutions to the General Assembly
to be voted on by the entire U.N. membership. The Council is
also authorized to monitor human rights violations across the
globe and to provide reports to the General Assembly. Special
procedures have been established to effectuate the Council's
monitoring function. The mechanism for such monitoring is
primarily the Special Rapporteurs who are selected for their
expertise in a given field.67 Special Rapporteurs are appointed by
the Human Rights Council and have a specific mandate to
investigate and monitor human rights compliance and
63 This number is reduced from the membership of fifty-three in the defunct
Commission on Human Rights. One of the biggest criticisms of the Commission of
Human Rights was the inability to keep human rights abusers off the council itself.
However, disbanding the Commission and replacing it with the Human Rights
Council has done little to alleviate criticisms of bias, most notably by levying
allegations solely against Israel. Jackson Diehl, Editorial, A Shadow on the Human
Rights Movement, WASH. POST, June 25, 2007, at A19.
64 Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, United Nations, Who We Are,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/WhoWeAre.aspx (last visited Jan. 10,
2009).
65 For example, the HRC is charged with promulgating human rights norms by
engaging in debate and deliberation. The Human Rights Council is also responsible
for monitoring compliance with human rights treaties and recommending action to
the General Assembly. See Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, United
Nations, The Human Rights Council, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil
(last visited Sept. 12, 2008).
66 Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, United Nations, Special
Procedures of the Human Rights Council, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/
special/index.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2008).
67 Two Special Rapporteurs have importance for our purposes: the Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Special Rapporteur on
Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related
Intolerance. As the names indicate, the Special Rapporteurs are divided into very
thematic areas and are considered experts in very narrow fields. Most Special
Rapporteurs receive information concerning allegations of human rights abuses and
send urgent appeals to the government demanding clarification. In 2007, over 1,000
letters were sent to 128 countries. Id.
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recommend solutions to human rights problems to the Council.
Alternatively, the Council can create a working group to monitor
compliance, as opposed to the Special Rapporteurs who operate
individually.
In addition to the Human Rights Council, the U.N. contains
several bodies whose tasks are to implement and monitor
compliance with human rights treaties.8 Unlike the Council,
these bodies are only concerned with monitoring compliance
based on the seven core human rights treaties.69
3. Implementation
While the provisions mentioned above created the
philosophical framework against which human rights would be
understood in the international context, the U.N. has grappled
with its implementation through the aforementioned bodies. The
General Assembly has continued to issue proclamations and
covenants, further defining the broad language of the Declaration
and establishing norms for implementation. °  There are
essentially two U.N. documents that provide protection for the
freedom of religion and belief: The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR")7  and the United Nations
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Belief ("1981 Resolution").72
6 These include the Human Rights Committee; the Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights; the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination; the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women; the Committee Against Torture; the Committee on the Rights of the Child;
and the Committee on Migrant Workers. Information on all of the bodies is available
at Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations, Human
Rights Bodies, http://www.ohchr.orgIENfHRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx
(last visited Sept. 7, 2008).
69 Id.
70 See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106A (XX), at 47, U.N. Doc. A/2106/Annex (Dec. 21, 1965)
("Considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set out therein ... ." (emphasis omitted));
UDHR, supra note 3, at 71 (recognizing "the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world").
7, ICCPR, supra note 5.
72 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55
(Nov. 25, 1981) [hereinafter 1981 Resolution].
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The ICCPR specifically identifies the notion of defamation
against groups generally and only marginally mentions
religious-based defamation. The operative provision provides
that "lelveryone shall have the right to hold opinions without
interference." 3 Perhaps more importantly, the ICCPR provides:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.
The exercise of the[se] rights . . .carries with it special duties
and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law
and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of
others; (b) For the protection of national security ... or of public
health or morals.7 4
This approach appears similar to the American approach to
free speech in that it seeks to protect, to the fullest extent
possible, the right to free expression, provided it does not
impinge upon the rights of others.75 While in the United States
there is no explicit provision providing protection for the listener
to seek information, the ICCPR statement that everyone has "the
right to freedom of expression" 76 and its brief explanation is
strikingly similar to the American approach, though defined
differently.
The ICCPR does not specifically target defamation of religion
as an operative "carve-out" for protection. However, article 20,
which places two important limitations on the right to free
expression apart from the catch-all provisions, states: "Any
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be
prohibited by law."7' Thus, the ICCPR contains an implicit
7 ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 19(1).
7' Id. art. 19(2)-(3).
7 See infra Part III.
76 ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 19(2).
Compare id. ("Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression ..
with U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech. . . ."). The U.N. takes a "positive rights" approach whereas the United
States takes a "negative rights" approach. What is remarkable about the U.N.
formulation is that when considered alongside the provision prohibiting abridgment
except under certain highly specific situations, the result appears analogous.
7 ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 20(2) (emphases added).
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tension between the right to free expression and the necessity of
curtailing this right when religious hostility will be created.
Furthermore, the ICCPR provides an individual with the right to
free expression-both in expressing and receiving other's
expression-while seemingly offering group protection against
these rights.7 9
The 1981 Resolution identifies several protections afforded
by religious liberties in much more explicit detail than the
ICCPR. This Resolution begins by explicitly stating that
everyone has the "right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion." ° It goes further to identify associated rights and
obligations, including the freedom to manifest one's belief in
public and private,8 1 freedom from coercion, 2 and freedom from
discrimination based on religious belief8 3 Significantly, the 1981
Resolution explicitly states that these rights and negative
freedoms stem from the principle of human dignity. It states in
relevant part:
Discrimination between human beings on the grounds of
religion or belief constitutes an affront to human dignity and a
disavowal of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
and shall be condemned as a violation of the human rights and
fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and enunciated in detail in the International
Covenants on Human Rights, and as an obstacle to friendly and
peaceful relations between nations.8
4
This provision indicates the philosophical continuity with the
U.N.'s previous declarations and underscores the foundational
role that human dignity plays in these international documents.
The 1981 Resolution makes clear that the U.N. defines the rights
and obligations found within its documents with reference to the
fundamental notion of human dignity enshrined in the UDHR.
79 See, e.g., Karen Eltis, Genetic Determinism and Discrimination: A Call To
Re-Orient Prevailing Human Rights Discourse To Better Comport with the Public
Implications of Individual Genetic Testing, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 282, 284 (2007)
(noting that the Canadian Constitution is modeled after the ICCPR and focuses
upon individual rather than collective rights).
o 1981 Resolution, supra note 72, art. 1(1).
81 Id.
82 Id. art. 1(2).
83 Id. art. 2(1).
84 Id. art. 3 (emphasis added).
2009] PROPHETS, CARTOONS, AND LEGAL NORMS 37
4. Human Dignity Rationale
The United Nations Charter enshrines this notion of human
dignity upon which international law is built: "We the peoples of
the United Nations determined ... to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person .... "85 The UDHR reflects this principle at
several points in the preamble:
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world ....
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights
of men and women and have determined to promote social
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom .... 8 6
Article 1 goes even further and states that "[a]ll human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one
another in a spirit of brotherhood.""7  Thus, the formative
documents of the United Nations espouse an individual ethic
grounded entirely in the inherent dignity of the human person.
However, the UDHR seemingly leaves for another day the
definition of human dignity. Most likely, the drafters
intentionally refrained from defining the term to allow
subsequent documents and developments to define its contours,
notwithstanding the question as to whether it can even be
defined."8
Subsequent U.N. documents and resolutions also reflect this
ethical framework. For example, the ICCPR explicitly references
the United Nations Charter in identifying its philosophical basis
in the preamble: "Considering that, in accordance with the
principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations,
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
85 U.N. Charter pmbl. (emphasis added).
86 UDHR, supra note 3, at 72.
87 Id. art. 1.
"' See, e.g., Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, The Third Reconstruction: An
Alternative to Race Consciousness and Colorblindness in Post-Slavery America, 54
ALA. L. REV. 483, 534 (2003) (recognizing the difficulty in defining human dignity).
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foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." 9
Similarly, the 1981 Resolution notes that any violation of its
provisions amounts to an affront of human dignity and is,
therefore, a violation of fundamental human rights.9" It is clear
that the United Nations has consistently defined human rights
with reference to human dignity.
This reliance upon the human dignity rationale stems from
the nature of the United Nations venture. In essence, it is the
only way to identify a truly "universal" set of human rights that
all cultures can agree upon and in which all can find some
common elements. 91  The inherent problem in identifying
universal values is that one necessarily begins to assert his or
her values upon another culture. By relying on human dignity,
the U.N. has effectively reduced the analysis to a baseline level
which all can provisionally agree upon.2 In other words, the
U.N. successfully drafted its formative documents based upon
broad, largely undefined principles that member countries did
not disagree with on a philosophical level at the very outset,
given the open-ended nature of the definition.
B. Defamation of Religion Provisions
1. Prior Provisions
In 1999, Pakistan authored a proposed resolution for the
Commission of Human Rights-the predecessor to the Human
Rights Council-entitled Defamation of Islam.93  The proposal
89 ICCPR, supra note 5, at 52-53.
90 See 1981 Resolution, supra note 72, art. 3; supra notes 59-61 and
accompanying text.
91 The obvious counter to this observation is that not all countries are willing to
sign various United Nations documents. This clearly demonstrates the significant
challenges that arise in attempting to identify universal, cross-cultural values.
Whether a truly universal ethic, on any subject matter at all, is even possible is
beyond the scope of this Article.
9 This much is evidenced by the initial vote for the UDHR of forty-eight to zero.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text. While eight countries abstained, all were
members of the Soviet bloc, allowing geopolitical forces to play a role. See supra note
60 and accompanying text. Jacques Maritain, one of the prominent authors of the
UDHR, famously quipped when asked whether they had reached an agreement,
stating that they had as long as they did not ask each other why. See MARY ANN
GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 77 (2001).
93 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOCI, Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and All Forms of Discrimination: Submitted by Pakistan, on Behalf of
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was severely criticized for highlighting only a single religion and
led to the subsequent name change to Defamation of Religion.94
The resolution was passed in August 1999 and a new resolution
was subsequently adopted in each of the following years, tracking
the same themes.95 In 2002, the Commission on Human Rights
passed a slightly different resolution entitled Combating
Defamation of Religions.96 In this newer version, the document
specifically singles out Islam as a religious tradition that has
experienced significant backlash.97 It is not difficult to ascertain
that this slightly stronger document was pushed through in the
aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001 in the United
States.98  In fact, the Special Rapporteur noted to the
Commission a rise in "Islamaphobia" in the West.99
2. "Defamation of Religion" 2006
The Commission on Human Rights and, subsequently, the
Human Rights Council have successfully passed resolutions
every year since the 1999 Resolution, with subtle name changes
and slightly altered provisions. 00 These resolutions went largely
unnoticed in the international community, most likely because
the States Members of the United Nations That Are Members of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/19991L.40 (Apr. 20, 1999).
94 See Press Release, United Nations, IPI Worried by Use of "Defamation of
Religions" Phrase in Int'l Statements, Fears It May Encourage Media Persecution
(Sept. 29, 2006).
9, See id.
96 G.A. Res. 2002/9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/200 (Apr. 15, 2002).
97 Id. 2-3, 7.
" Human Rights Council, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution
60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled "Human Rights Council": Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Asma Jahangir, and the Special
Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia
and Related Intolerance, Doudou Diane, further to Human Rights Council Decision
1 / 107 on Incitement to Racial and Religious Hatred and the Promotion of Tolerance,
7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/3 (Sept. 20, 2006) (submitted by Asma Jahangir & Doudou
Diane). The Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Doudou Diane noted that
racism is a serious threat to democracy due to the centrality of the amalgamation of
the factors of race, culture, and religion in the post-9/11 ideological atmosphere of
intolerance and polarization. Id.
9 ECOSOC Report on All Forms of Discrimination, supra note 18, 2, 16.
100 The names of the various resolutions began as "Defamation of Religions."
Subsequent versions included "Combating Defamation of Religions as a Means To
Promote Human Rights, Social Harmony and Religious and Cultural Diversity" and
ultimately, "Combating Defamation of Religions." See supra notes 93-95 and
accompanying text.
40 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 48:19
they are nonbinding and the product of two U.N. bodies that have
been strongly criticized by Western democracies. 11 With the
exception of scattered interest groups, the resolutions were
passed with almost no fanfare. In 2006, the Human Rights
Commission once again passed the resolution entitled, as before,
Combating Defamation of Religions.112 However, this resolution
took on increased significance in light of the worldwide violence
stemming from the Danish cartoons and the resulting confusion
by many non-Muslims in the aftermath that simply could not
comprehend the reaction. 103
So what has changed from 1999 to 2006? First, as
mentioned just above, the context. To many sensibilities, it
would seem natural that the Muslim world would push the U.N.
to adopt protective measures in light of the rise of the small
number of visible, fundamental Islamicists, such that they would
not experience a similar backlash that inevitably would follow.
Secondly, the increasing number of member countries that
support these resolutions, coupled with the repeated passage of
the resolutions, serves to legitimize the otherwise nonbinding
international agreements.
The General Assembly resolutions may contain soft
international law. With the passage of time and compliant state
behavior, some resolutions pave the way for the formation of a
multilateral treaty or customary international law. In almost all
cases, these resolutions reflect the international community's
101 See, e.g., Jeroen Gutter, Special Procedures and the Human Rights Council:
Achievements and Challenges Ahead, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 93 (2007) ("The life of
the Commission on Human Rights... was turbulent and scattered with
criticism .... ").
102 In 2005, the resolution passed by a vote of 101 to 53, with 37 non-committed
states in the General Assembly. See Liaquat Ali Khan, Combating Defamation of
Religions, MEDIA WITH CONSCIENCE, Dec. 31, 2006, http://mwcnews.net/content/
view/11529/2/1/1. In 2006, the number of member countries voting for passage of the
resolution increased from 10 to 111. Id. However, the number of countries who voted
against the resolution actually increased by a single vote to fifty-four, while the
number of non-committed countries decreased to twenty-seven. Id. These numbers
indicate that a substantial opposition continues to exist to the defamation of religion
resolutions. However, the resolutions have also received increasing support over the
past year as well.
103 Many in the West expressed their objection to this resolution in light of the
reaction across the Muslim world. It should be noted, however, that a significant
number of countries registered strong objections to the resolutions all along. Many of
the objections in 2006 were simply renewed objections with a more definitive
context.
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views, which cannot be dismissed as mere opinions. These views,
even when they fall short of opinio juris, influence multilateral
relations and compose the sociology of international law.1"4
The practical result is that the defamation of religion
resolutions have taken on an increased importance in
international law and international relations, despite having
undergone little change.
C. Operative Provisions
Given the increased importance of the resolutions, what do
they provide for in practical terms? First, the 2006 Resolution
itself urges countries to establish measures to ensure that
political institutions and other organizations do not help create
an atmosphere of violence and hostility toward religious
groups.1 °5 Specifically, the Resolution provides: "The Commission
on Human Rights ... [u]rges States to take resolute action to
prohibit the dissemination of racist and xenophobic ideas and
material aimed at any religion or its followers that constitute
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence ....106 The
Resolution also notes that the Commission "Idleplores the use of
the print, audio-visual and electronic media, including the
Internet, and any other means to incite acts of violence,
xenophobia or related intolerance and discrimination against
Islam or any other religion."107 These provisions are directly
aimed at preventing publications such as those in Denmark.
As is evident, this obligation on the government is quite
broad and rather indefinite. Given the relative novelty of these
provisions taking on a major role in international relations, there
is very little to draw upon to make substantive determinations as
to what sort of material falls within these categories. 08 However,
given the context and slightly increased support in 2006, it is
safe to assume that at the very least the Resolution is intended to
touch on controversies such as the Danish cartoons. In fact, this
Resolution, coupled with others passed in the wake of the cartoon
1'4 Khan, supra note 102.
105 Id.
106 2006 Resolution, supra note 18, 9 (emphasis omitted).
107 Id. 6.
108 For example, the resolution does not attempt to define what constitutes
"aiming" at a religion or religious group. Furthermore, the very question of what is a
racist or xenophobic idea does not have a simple answer.
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controversy, provides even more evidence of the HRC's intent to
target these types of publications. °9
Ultimately, the Resolution leaves the international
community at a crossroads with regard to the intersection of free
speech and religious freedom. 10 What is clear is that the U.N.
has now demonstrated a willingness to curtail other freedoms
identified in prior documents and resolutions in the face of
religious insensitivities. The remaining question is whether this
approach comports with the human dignity heritage of the U.N.
and whether the practical implementation provides more security
for individual human rights than the absence of any directives.
III. THE AMERICAN APPROACH
The American approach to defamation of religion is much
more defined and clear than the emerging international scheme.
At the outset, it is important to note that the U.S. scheme has
the major advantage of being able to proscribe legally binding
legislation as opposed to suggestions for countries to adopt.
Additionally, the U.S. approach has two other distinct
advantages: (1)a clearly defined political system as opposed to an
amalgamation of political systems sitting at the same table and
(2)over 225 years to develop-or adapt-a value structure
underpinning the relevant provisions.
At the forefront of the American system are the First
Amendment's protections concerning free expression."' In this
context, the First Amendment's free speech protections are often
viewed as being in tension with the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment." 2  While free speech is not necessarily given
109 See, e.g., U.N. Rights Body Condemns "Defamation" of Religion, REUTERS,
Mar. 30, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL3041411220070330;
Free Speech Resolution Watered Down To Please Islamic States,
http://blog.unwatch.org/?cat=9 (Mar. 28, 2006).
110 Compare ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 19(1)-(2) ("Everyone shall have the right
to hold opinions without interference... . Everyone shall have the right to freedom
of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in
the form of art, or through any other media of his choice." (emphasis added)), with
2006 Resolution, supra note 18, 9 ("[Plrohibit the dissemination of racist and
xenophobic ideas ....").
"I "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press. .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
112 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." Id.
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primacy in the American constitutional scheme, the values
enshrined in the religion clauses lend to a libertarian
understanding of the relationship between free speech and
religious liberties. 13
In our liberal democracy, free speech guarantees are given
extraordinarily high protections 14  and are viewed as
fundamental to the flourishing of our political system.1" A
liberal democracy that encourages, and to some degree requires,
participation in public discourse must have concomitant
protection for the very speech that allows the democracy to
flourish. The individual autonomy that free speech protects is
inextricably bound with the success of a liberal democracy as it
permits collective self-actualization. Robert Post noted:
Public discourse merits unique constitutional protection because
it is the process through which the democratic "self," the agent
of self-government, is itself constituted through the
reconciliation of individual and collective autonomy.
Constitutional solicitude for public discourse, therefore,
presupposes that those participating in public discourse are free
and autonomous. 116
Underlying this justification is the "free market of ideas"
concept,117 which, in turn, presupposes that there is an intrinsic
113 Some scholars suggest that a value fundamental to the religion clauses,
especially given their proximity to the free speech provisions, is that American
citizens are entitled to be exposed to other religious viewpoints. In other words, the
.marketplace of ideas" concept, discussed below, applies in the context of religion
because it contributes to the search for truth, including religious truth. See James A.
Sonne, The Perils of Universal Accommodation: The Workplace Religious Freedom
Act of 2003 and the Affirmative Action of 147,096,000 Souls, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1023, 1076 (2004).
114 Free speech holds such a high status in this country that government
restrictions are scrutinized very carefully. For "content-based" restrictions where the
government seeks to restrict speech based on the very content of the expression-as
would be the case in restricting defamatory statements toward religion-the
government restriction must pass "strict scrutiny." See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S.
191, 198 (1992) (applying strict scrutiny where government regulation prohibited
displaying campaign materials within 100 feet of polling station on election day).
I" See generally Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute,
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 (1961) (arguing that free speech is necessary in a liberal
democracy).
116 Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of
Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1128 (1993).
17 This expression is attributed to Justice Holmes. Nicholas Wolfson, A
Transactional Cost Analysis of the First Amendment, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 25
(1991) (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
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value in individuals being exposed to a broad range of ideas. 18
In a pragmatic sense, a liberal democracy is built upon the
principle that the citizenship ultimately retains control of the
government in an indirect sense." 9  Accordingly, without the
ability to express thoughts and ideas, the citizenship literally
cannot maintain any control of the government because a
government that controls speech implicitly prevents active
participation and grassroots development. 20  In other words, a
liberal democracy will be choked off at the threshold without the
free exchange of ideas that it requires for active participation and
subsequent self-determination. Also, implicit in the free market
of ideas is the economic justification that "truth"--whatever form
it might take-is best accessible through the free market rather
than state control. 121
To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent,
as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole
heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment,
as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our
salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that
experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against
attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught
with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the
lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save
the country.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
118 This is true even if the ideas or concepts being espoused are odious and
offensive to others. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978)
("[Tihe fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for
suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that
consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a central
tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the
marketplace of ideas.").
"' See James C. Kraska, Global and Going Nowhere: Sustainable Development,
Global Governance & Liberal Democracy, 34 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 247, 286
(2006) ([A] liberal democracy include[s] ... citizens instilled with civic virtue,
effective popular control of the organs of government ... ").
120 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH 241-52 (1993); Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1635 (2005).
121 See Wolfson, supra note 117.
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The normative dimension of the free market idea is simply
that "[h]uman dignity depends on the freedom of the mind." 22 In
other words, the First Amendment speech provisions protect
"self-expression or autonomy interests of the individual.'1 23 The
profound implication of this statement is that "the unfettered
freedom to express oneself in speech or writing, or to listen to the
same, is essential to human dignity, creativity, and
personhood." 24 In other words, there is an identifiable, inherent
good in being free to speak.12 This strain of thought has its roots
with John Stuart Mill, who claimed that freedom of speech
advances the search for truth where no idea is silenced on its
own merits. 26  He maintained that this search for truth was
further legitimized because individuals would seek to defend
their own beliefs based on the rationality of their positions,
thereby reducing the concern for patently irrational beliefs
coming to dominate the political landscape. 27
Despite the rather broad language that the Supreme Court
has used in some cases to describe the extent of the protection
afforded to speech under the First Amendment, 2 ' not all speech
is protected. Historically, states have relied upon criminal
statutes to provide protection from blasphemous speech.
129
However, these laws have long been discredited and held
unconstitutional because they violate the First Amendment. In
122 Koppelman, supra note 120, at 1637.
123 Wolfson, supra note 117.
124 Id. (emphasis added). This notion of human dignity being protected by the
United States' libertarian approach to free speech might be strange to Europeans,
who seemingly posit that human dignity is not protected by this approach. Rather,
they view free speech as one value among many, all of which are to be balanced
against the notion of human dignity. See Peter R. Teachout, Making "Holocaust
Denial" a Crime: Reflections on European Anti-Negationist Laws from the Perspective
of U.S. Constitutional Experience, 30 VT. L. REV. 655, 658 (2006). By contrast, the
American experience is that human dignity is protected and flourishes when
individuals are exposed to various expressions and ideas, harmful or not. Id. at 659.
"I See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984)
("The First Amendment presupposes that the freedom to speak one's mind is not
only an aspect of individual liberty-and thus a good unto itself-but also is
essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.").
126 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 64-67 (Currin V. Shields ed., The Liberal
Arts Press 1956) (1859).
127 Id. at 63-64.
128 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 590 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (discussing that free speech is based on the common sense of the people).
129 See Susan W. Brenner, Law in an Era of Pervasive Technology, 15 WIDENER
L.J. 667, 694 (2006).
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terms of strictly blasphemous speech, the United States "protects
modes of expression that are deliberately provocative or
shocking" and "reflects a concern that free expression not be
chilled by uncertainty regarding where such fine lines might be
drawn by courts."130
Accordingly, when seeking to criminalize allegedly
blasphemous speech, citizens must either utilize advocacy along
with social pressures to discourage the behavior or seek to fit the
speech into one of the categories that the Supreme Court has
carved out in their First Amendment jurisprudence as
warranting no protection.' To this point, the Supreme Court
has refused to recognize an exception for hate speech. Instead,
the Court will seek to characterize the particular speech into a
different category with well-established protections.'32
An American citizen objecting to the publication of the
Muhammad cartoons in an American newspaper would have few,
if any, arguments warranting government proscription of the
speech. For example, an argument drawing upon the "true
threat" category would undoubtedly fail as there is no imminent
danger posed by the speech. 3 3 Similarly, any argument claiming
that the cartoons are fighting words will undoubtedly fail
because the cartoons lack a specific target.13 Essentially, there
130 David M. Smolin, Exporting the First Amendment?: Evangelism, Proselytism,
and the International Religious Freedom Act, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 685, 693 (2000).
131 Categories include: true threats, Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708
(1969); obscenity, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21 (1973); fighting words,
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); and libel, N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964).
132 For example, hate speech has not been officially recognized as an exception
to the free speech provisions. Hate speech arguments are best framed as examples of
other exceptions. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347-48 (2003) (discussing
that while a statute prohibiting cross-burning with an intent to intimidate is deemed
constitutional, a jury instruction that cross-burning itself provides prima facie
evidence of intent is unconstitutional). In Black, the Court carefully sidestepped the
question of hate speech by couching the offense in the language of true threats. Id.
at 360.
113 "True threats" have traditionally been very narrowly drawn, requiring
serious expression of intent to commit a criminal act that jeopardizes the safety and
well-being of another. See, e.g., Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (reversing conviction where
man commented that he would like to assassinate the President). In the context of a
cartoon, there is little chance that a court would agree that a caricature of
Muhammad would be tantamount to a threat of physical harm.
" Like true threats, "fighting words" are narrowly construed, requiring
offensive words to be directed at a specific person, resulting in a physical
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is little judicial recourse for American citizens to protest the
publication of something that is viewed as a simple caricature in
the eyes of many Americans.
As the foregoing demonstrates, the United States is far more
receptive to free speech than Europe and other countries around
the world."' 5 In essence, an individual seeking redress must
prove to the satisfaction of the court that the speech falls into one
of the categories that have been carved out of the First
Amendment. Short of this, the Constitution protects virtually all
forms of speech, even speech that is especially offensive or
harmful to a particular group, because it contributes to both
truth-seeking in a liberal democracy and the notion of self-
autonomy that is fundamental to the U.S. political system.
IV. ANALYSIS
Given the significant emphasis placed on the concept of
human dignity in U.N. human rights instruments, one must
consider which approach best protects these principles in the
context of the Danish cartoon controversy. A comparative
analysis demonstrates that the American approach provides
greater protection for the values underpinning these human
dignity concepts, as it provides greater protections. The U.N.
approach, on the other hand, unnecessarily impinges upon other
well-recognized human rights.
A. International Human Rights Should Be Reconceived as
Reflecting an Individualistic Ethic Because It Allows
Appropriate Balances Between Competing Rights
The difficulty with the cartoon controversy is that it balances
two different competing rights that are well-recognized on the
international level: (1) free expression and (2) freedom from
discrimination. Both the American and U.N. approaches contain
confrontation. See, e.g., Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (upholding the arrest of a
Jehovah's Witness causing a scene by insulting a group).
135 This includes Denmark, which actually recognizes hate speech and
blasphemy laws. See infra notes 159-160 and accompanying text. In fact, the
Muslim community demanded that the regional public prosecutor bring charges
based on the cartoons. See Winfield, supra note 49, at 36. After bAlancing the
possible fallout, both politically and socially, the prosecutor decided not to prosecute
the newspaper under the hate speech laws. Id. The Muslim community was
obviously outraged, specifically because the state did not prosecute the case despite
clear statutory authority. Id.
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explicit normative justifications that stem from the derivative
principle that human beings are endowed with fundamental
human dignity.136 When faced with competing interests, the
approach that most adequately protects the integrity of both
rights should prevail.'37 This inquiry begins with what human
dignity demands of an individualistic ethic.
Because the U.N. has placed such emphasis with the
individual and the individual's sense of worth and autonomy, one
must consider the practical effect of inhibiting speech such as
satirical cartoons. The U.N. has seemingly adopted a "positive
rights" approach in continually formulating the resolution, which
calls upon governments to formulate legislation to protect
listeners from hearing a harmful message.1 38  However, the
provisions contained within the U.N. instruments do not
necessarily require this result, and an emphasis on dignity as
promoting individual autonomy provides a better perspective.
Kent Greenawalt provides an excellent conception of the
interaction between the notion of autonomy and dignity.
Greenawalt links the two in arguing that suppressing certain
views fails to treat citizens equally and, thus, without dignity. 39
He is explicit that this suppression burdens the individual,
stating that it "represents a kind of contempt for citizens that is
objectionable independent of its consequences .'140 His conception
highlights the problem inherent in the 2006 Resolution-
applying defamation of religion prohibitions necessarily requires
a significant curtailment of free expression with regard to certain
views. As Greenawalt notes, this violates individual autonomy
by failing to treat citizens equally, thus undermining individual
dignity."' This is particularly problematic in that it results in a
large impingement of one of the most fundamental tenets of
136 See supra Part II.A.4 and notes 122-124.
137 See Jack Donnelly, The Relative Universality of Human Rights, 29 HUM. RTS.
Q. 281, 301-02 (2007) (citing hate speech and freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion as two examples of intersecting human rights that must be carefully
balanced in enacting legislation).
138 A "negative rights" approach would seek to curtail government interference
with any rights. The United States adopts the negative rights approach in its
attempt to give the widest latitude to the exercise of individual rights without
interference.
139 Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 152-53
(1989).
140 Id. at 153.
141 Id.
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human dignity. This result fails to provide an adequate balance
between the rights, yielding an overprotection of certain values
at the great expense of others. 42
Additionally, not only does this fail to treat citizens equally
and with their requisite dignity, but it ironically results in
permitting a group to assert its belief system on the majority. In
the context of the Danish cartoons, disallowing their publication
would result in forcing members of other religious faiths to
accept and apply the prohibition on any religious caricatures,
despite not experiencing the same level of offense.
By contrast, the American approach provides adequate
protection to minority religious viewpoints without sacrificing
more free expression than necessary. American law protects
religious minorities from violence or discrimination without
requiring a concomitant restraint on speech. 143 While Muslims in
the United States would certainly have been offended by the
publication of the cartoons in an American newspaper, American
law does not value their perspective higher than any other,
thereby treating individuals on an equal basis. While some
might argue that the United States does not adequately prevent
discrimination or incitement to hostility as referenced in U.N.
provisions, any deviation from international norms "is on
behalf of a strong implementation of another vitally important
human right[. ''145
B. The Resolution Results in an Overly Paternalistic View of
Human Dignity
Greenawalt's conception of human dignity underpinning free
speech justifications also raises the issue of paternalism.
Specifically, the 2006 Resolution encourages member countries to
adopt regulations that criminalize allegedly defamatory
statements, which necessarily must be grounded in its consistent
human dignity justification. 46 Taken to the extreme, this implies
that, as a matter of dignity, it is incumbent upon the state, which
142 See Donnelly, supra note 137, at 302-03.
14 Id. at 303 (describing hate speech provisions).
14 See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 20(2) ("Any advocacy of national, racial or
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence
shall be prohibited by law.").
145 Donnelly, supra note 137, at 302.
146 2006 Resolution, supra note 18, T 11.
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is, more often than not, comprised of a number of different
religious traditions, to identify what is appropriate to view and
what is not rather than leaving that decision to the individual's
self-judgment. This flies in the face of principles of human
dignity and its corollary in autonomy and self-determination.
Of course, one must consider the argument that can be made
by minority religious believers that a libertarian view of free
speech, such as one finds in the United States, risks offending
minority believers because free speech is inextricably bound up
with the majority culture.147  Notwithstanding the fact that
minority religious views undoubtedly require protection from the
state in many regards, it is inconsistent with this conception of
human dignity to prevent an individual from being exposed to
speech that is harmful to a particular group. Human dignity is
implicated in many religious rights, such as the right to religious
expression, 14 the right to freely change one's beliefs, 149 and the
right not to be coerced into any belief.50 All of these rights as
identified in U.N. documents speak to an individual ethic,
placing the autonomous individual at the center of the focus.
However, the 2006 Resolution places religious groups over and
above the individual in terms of the relative values of the rights
at stake.
The foregoing is not meant to suggest that groups cannot be
afforded certain protections. For example, nobody would deny
that under U.N. conventions, a particular religious group has the
147 See, e.g., Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied
Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL.
L. REv. 871, 883 (1994) (arguing that hate speech regulation is necessary because
free speech protection inevitably favors the white male majority in the United States
without providing sufficient substantive protection for minorities).
148 See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 18(1) ("Th[e] right [to religious belief] shall
include freedom . . . to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice
and teaching."). Presumably, religious expression is also included in the free
expression articles. See id. art. 19(2) (stating the right to expression, including the
right to freely impart or receive information).
"' See id. art. 18(1) ("This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a
religion or belief of his choice.... ."). This statement is understood to mean that one
has the right to change religions as well. In fact, this very interpretation led to
politically Islamic countries to either abstain or vote against the ICCPR, as Shari'a
law is very clear that changing religion, or apostasy, is not allowed.
15 Id. art. 18(2) ("No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.").
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right to meet for worship services without state interference." 1
However, the resolutions offering protection for defamation of
religion stem from individual concerns. In other words, while on
its surface it appears to offer religious groups protection, the
U.N. is ultimately seeking to protect the individual from being
offended by allegedly defamatory speech. Accordingly, these
resolutions must be viewed as rooted in an individual ethic.
Furthermore, while the U.N. seeks to establish human rights
norms throughout the globe, the primary aim is to identify
universal values, which may be translated into principles and
suggestions for countries that foster an atmosphere where these
rights flourish fully. When rights inevitably come into conflict, it
is incumbent upon the U.N. to establish provisions in which the
rights enumerated therein are maximized to the greatest extent
possible.'52 With the defamation of religion resolutions, the U.N.
has effectively stated that paternalistic notions of what is
appropriate for religious believers to be exposed to outweigh the
right to promulgate the speech. In other words, the U.N. has
elevated a "human right" that finds no grounding in prior
conventions on fundamental religious freedom rights above
explicitly enumerated free expression rights. This is wholly
inconsistent for an organization that has strived to maintain
consistency based upon baseline principles that all cultures can
find agreeable.
C. The Defamation of Religion Provisions Are Overly Vague for
Implementation
Particularly troubling is the resolutions' lack of an adequate
definition for the term "defamation." Admittedly, it is
extraordinarily difficult to achieve international consensus on
any matter, let alone definitions that satisfy everyone. However,
the ambiguity inherent in the 2006 Resolution risks a broad
range of differing interpretations which might run afoul of
international human right norms. 153
151 See UDHR, supra note 3 ("Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief,
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.").
152 See Donnelly, supra note 137, at 302-03.
'" See infra Part IV.D.1.
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The only statements resembling a definition of defamation
derive from the provision urging countries to adopt prohibitions
against certain types of behavior. Specifically, the Resolution
"[u]rges States to take resolute action to prohibit the
dissemination [through political institutions and organizations]
of racist and xenophobic ideas and material aimed at any religion
or its followers that constitute incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence."154 The U.N. seemingly defines defamation
as "racist" or "xenophobic" ideas, which must be aimed at a
particular religion, but declines to further extrapolate on what
this means. Such sweeping terms could conceivably encompass a
tremendous amount of material depending upon the perspective
of those making the determination. Conversely, these terms
could be interpreted very narrowly, leaving some frustrated by a
government's perceived inaction despite statutory authorization
to prohibit the material. More concerning is that the substantive
a posterori element of this provision, seemingly requiring some
sort of public reaction. This requires the government to
determine whether an idea is likely to have discriminatory
effects. To make this determination, the government might be
called upon to make a value judgment based upon the religious
beliefs of the allegedly defamed religion.
Furthermore, this ambiguous definition leads to possible
double standards. Undoubtedly, one of the major aims of
international human rights legislation is to ensure the protection
of minority viewpoints.155 To take the cartoon example, the
Danish government is forced to make a determination-here
evidenced by their inaction-as to whether the cartoons are
racist and aimed at Islam or more likely whether they were
aimed at inciting discrimination, hostility, or violence. Once
again, this results in a minority viewpoint being permitted to
press their perspective upon the majority due to their particular
sensitivities and as a result, causing a degradation of the human
right to free expression as a result.
" 2006 Resolution, supra note 18, 10.
The U.N. has passed many resolutions, treaties, and covenants that address
the rights of minorities. See, e.g., Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
supra note 5; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990).
2009] PROPHETS, CARTOONS, AND LEGAL NORMS 53
Hypothetically, had the Danish government decided to
prosecute the newspaper according to its express authorization in
the statute, it likely would have affirmed the action upon
discrimination grounds. However, if a Muslim newspaper
published a cartoon in Denmark depicting Jesus Christ carrying
a gun or some analogous depiction, the Danish government
would not be able to prosecute the newspaper on blasphemy
grounds, given that the likelihood of discrimination simply would
not be present because of the substantial Christian majority in
the country.'56 Ultimately, the ambiguous definition results in
varying interpretations entirely dependent upon the specific
context. This is simply bad law, especially when presented in
light of the allegedly universal nature of the human rights at
stake.
By contrast, the American system provides much more
structure for the general public. Obviously, there are no
defamation of religion provisions requiring value judgments by
the state. This does not mean, however, that minority religions
do not have any protection against statements and images that
cut very deeply. It does mean that the allegedly harmful
statements must fall into one of the well-defined categories of
speech that is not protected by the First Amendment mentioned
previously. 15 7  Applying the American approach, the Danish
cartoons would clearly not fall into any of these categories, and it
would be incumbent upon Muslim citizens to express their
outrage in an appropriate manner-to convince the public that
they have a moral obligation to refrain from demeaning them so
deeply. At its heart, the American approach requires an
individual response stemming from an individual moral
obligation, which is more closely akin to what the U.N. human
rights doctrine requires.158
D. Practical Result Does Not Guarantee Better Results
The 2006 Resolution urges member states to make necessary
provisions to effectuate the defamation of religion provisions.
This leaves two important questions to address. First, how have
defamation laws impacted religious liberty in practice? Second,
156 Of the 5.4 million citizens of Denmark, just over 200,000 are professed
Muslims. See Bilefsky, supra note 12.
I" See supra notes 128-132.
158 See supra Part V.A.
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do the regulations called for by the 2006 Resolution require too
much state interference?
1. The Danish Experience with Defamation Laws
The Danish experience with hate speech and blasphemy
laws, which are in accordance with the 2006 Resolution (although
they were in place long beforehand) warrant significant concern.
The hate speech law makes it a crime for "[a]ny person
[to] ... persecute[U or incite[] hatred against any group of the
Danish population because of its creed, race or nationality."159
Denmark's blasphemy law criminalized actions by "[a]ny person
who exposes to ridicule or insults the dogmas or worship of any
lawfully existing religious community."160 Individuals convicted
under the hate speech statute could be punished by up to two
years imprisonment in addition to a fine.'' Punishment under
the blasphemy laws carries a sentence of up to four months
imprisonment in addition to a fine.162 Prosecutors are specifically
authorized to prosecute news organizations that publish any
words or images that insult or ridicule any religious group.1 63
As the Danish cartoon incident made abundantly clear, even
if the protections recommended by the U.N. 2006 Resolution are
in place, it does not necessarily yield the result intended. In this
specific example, the prosecutor to whom the Danish Muslim
community appealed to for a prosecution of Flemming Rose or
the newspaper ultimately decided not to proceed with criminal
charges. 64  This result understandably incensed the Muslim
population, who felt as though the state had affirmatively
discriminated against their community despite a clear statutory
authorization to prosecute. 16 5 In the end, the Danish government
was caught in a human rights and religious liberty trap: Apply
the vague blasphemy and hate speech laws on the books by
prosecuting the newspaper and arguably curtail free expression
protected under international law or decline to prosecute under
the criminal laws and risk violating international provisions
159 BORGERLIG STRAFFELOV § 266b, translated in Danish Criminal Code § 266b
(G.E.C. Gad, 1958).
I- Id. § 140.




165 See id. at 36.
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against religious discrimination. In either scenario, the Danish
experience demonstrates the potential difficulties in
administering the defamation of religion laws domestically while
maintaining compliance with established international human
right norms.
It should also be noted that these concerns are not limited to
the Danish experience or to countries with separationist political
structures. This could prove particularly troublesome in
theocratic states, particularly Islamic theocracies. In Pakistan,
which has been the driving force behind the defamation of
religion resolutions all along,166 the government is constructed
and laws are crafted according to the precepts of Islamic Shari'a
law. Shari'a, which currently carries the force of law in many
Islamic countries, punishes the crime of apostasy, defined as the
renunciation of a religious faith, 16 7 by death. 16  Extreme
punishment may also be levied upon non-Muslims who attempt
to practice their faith in any public manner. 169 In countries that
do implement these Shari'a provisions to any degree, 170 religious
liberties are extremely curtailed for non-Muslim citizens. The
2006 Resolution provides another tool for these governments to
enforce legal penalties upon religious dissenters. It is not hard to
imagine a theocratic government criminally punishing a religious
dissenter claiming that the majority religion of the populace is
not the true religion. All of these concerns inevitably reveal that
the 2006 Resolution actually draws countries closer to violation
166 Pakistan often spoke on behalf of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference,
a bloc of Muslim states organized to debate and respond to concerns stemming from
the United Nations human rights documents. See U.N. Rights Body Condemns
"Defamation" of Religion, REUTERS ALERTNET, Mar. 30, 2007, http://www.alertnet.
org/thenews/newsdesk/L30414112.htm.
167 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 55 (10th ed. 1997) (defining
apostacy).
" This issue arises often. On Easter day in 2008, Pope Benedict controversially
baptized a Muslim into the Catholic faith. See Nicole Winfield, Pope Baptizes
Prominent Italian Muslim, BREITBART.COM, Mar. 23, 2008, http://www.breitbart.
com/article.php?id=D8VIR44GO&showarticle=l. Magdi Allam, the Muslim being
baptized, fully understood that the implication of his conversion would be a call for
his murder from some in the Muslim community. Id.
166 See Jeffrey Goldberg, Washington Discovers Christian Persecution, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 1997, § 6, at 46. Whether Pakistan, or any other country, strictly
follows the tenets of Shari'a law to these extremes is an entirely different question.
See id. Although, there is some indication that non-Muslims experience extreme
discrimination in many Islamic theocracies, such as Iran. See id.
170 Even in countries where Shari'a provisions are not strictly enforced, the
penalties for blasphemy may differ depending on one's religious status.
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of international human rights norms rather than offering further
protection.
2. Does the Resolution Require Too Much Interference?
Mandating that member states adopt anti-defamation laws
with respect to religion at the risk of international political
pressure ultimately requires a state to take a position between
competing viewpoints and further requires the state to determine
what constitutes blasphemous speech versus non-violative
speech. While this result may be compatible in certain countries
in which the political system is closely tied to a particular
religion, it would be incompatible with other political systems
espousing religious neutrality. For example, a theocratic country
such as Iran would have little difficulty in politically justifying a
decision based on religious doctrine. However, requiring a
government to interpret or inquire into a particular religious
belief is wholly incompatible in a strict separationist political
system. It is very difficult to believe that an arm of the United
States Government would be permitted to determine whether the
cartoons that appeared in the Danish newspaper were truly
defamatory to the Muslim conscience. Furthermore, the
mandate requires the state to make determinations based upon
an ambiguous standard, as mentioned previously.171
Like the very notion of defamation of religion, hate speech
and blasphemy laws tend to be rather vague and indefinable. 72
What images amount to ridicule? What types of words degrade a
group of persons for their religious beliefs? More to the point, do
cartoons that depict Muhammad with a bomb-shaped turban
ridicule any dogma of Islam? These are the questions that the
Danish authorities were forced to confront and do not yield easy
answers. By virtue of the laws' ambiguities, the government is
forced into this fray and is forced to make difficult value
determinations. As has been discussed, these value judgments
can have a significant adverse impact on the minority
religions that the laws are designed to protect. 17 3
171 See supra Part I.C.
172 See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text.
173 See supra Part IV.C.
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CONCLUSION
The Danish cartoon controversy demonstrates the delicate
balance between competing human rights recognized on the
international level. It is not difficult to see how deeply words and
images can harm individuals, especially if those individuals have
experienced and continue to experience discrimination
worldwide. Nothing in this Article is intended to suggest that
different religions, specifically Islam in this context, do not feel
the pain of hurtful words. Nor does this Article intend to
legitimize or give a seal of approval to any particular words or
images on a moral or ethical level.
Rather, this Article intends to demonstrate the danger in
overreacting to the cartoon controversy and the violence it begot
by formulating paternalistic legal norms under the guise of
human dignity. If the rights delineated in U.N. documents are
conceived as containing an individualistic ethic based upon
human autonomy, the 2006 Resolution signifies a concerning
departure from the mandates of human dignity. Furthermore,
domestic implementation of the Resolution in the member
countries risks involving the government in questions that it
cannot, and should not, be forced to ask.
This is not to suggest that the American structure is perfect.
Permitting hurtful language and images in the United States
risks breeding institutional resentment and possibly significant
discrimination, especially in the aftermath of the events of
September 11. However, this approach is intellectually honest in
that it creates an atmosphere that is most conducive to the
protection of human rights and places the ultimate responsibility
for censorship with the individual. This is entirely consistent
with the individual ethic espoused by U.N. human rights
instruments. It presents a more viable and protective alternative
than wholesale criminalization of defamatory speech against
religion, whatever that term may mean.
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